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Scholarship and Fellowship Grants
Section 117 of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954

Rita M. Voerding is an Internal Revenue
Agent in Cheyenne, Wyoming and serves as
Joint Compliance Coordinator for the State of
Wyoming.
Ms. Voerding is a graduate of Boston Uni
versity. She served in the Boston and the
New Haven offices of the Internal Revenue
Service and was the Internal Revenue Ser
vice Renegotiation Officer of Rhode Island
and Connecticut when she moved to the
west. After several years as a partner and
office manager for a construction firm she
returned to the Internal Revenue Service in
1966.
Ms. Voerding is a member of the Cheyenne
Chapter of the American Society of Women
Accountants.

Rita M. Voerding
Cheyenne, Wyoming

The author discusses the tax effects of
scholarships and fellowship grants.

Section 117(a) of the Internal Revenue
Code provides the general rule that gross
income does not include any amount re
ceived as a scholarship at an educational
institution or as a fellowship grant. Sec
tion 117(a) also excludes from income any
amount received to cover expenses for
travel, research, clerical help, or equip
ment which are incident to the excludable
scholarship or fellowship grant, but only
to the extent that the amount is actually
expended for these purposes.
In the case of individuals who are can
didates for degrees, Section 117(b) places
limitations on the general exclusions set
forth in Section 117(a) by providing that
these individuals cannot exclude from
gross income that portion of a scholarship
or fellowship grant which represents
payment for research, teaching, or other
services in the nature of part-time em
ployment.
Section 117(b) also states if teaching,
research, or other services are required of
all candidates (whether or not recipients
of scholarships or fellowship grants) for a
particular degree as a condition to receiv
ing such degree, such teaching, research,
or other services, shall not be regarded as
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part-time employment. It is this state
ment in Section 117(b) and the similar
statement in Regulations 1.117-2(a)(2)
which has caused much confusion and
resulted in the litigation of many cases
involving candidates for degrees. The
question here is whether the statement
("If teaching, research, or other services
are required of all candidates (whether or
not recipients of scholarships or fellow
ship grants) for a particular degree, such
teaching, research, or other services shall
not be regarded as part-time employ
ment") is a "mechanical" test which, if
met, would automatically exclude pay
ments received as a scholarship or fellow
ship.
It is the position of the Internal Revenue
Service that this statement in Section
117(b)(1) is not a mere "mechanical" test.
The Internal Revenue Service believes
that a "primary purpose" test must first
be applied. It is our position that a proper
reading of the statute requires that before
the exclusion can apply, the payment
sought to be excluded must have the nor
mal characteristics associated with the
terms "scholarship" and "fellowship".
The Internal Revenue Service feels the

case of Elmer L. Reese, Jr. and Dorothy L.
Reese, 45 T.C. 407(1966), affirmed 373 F.
2d 742(1967), is a substantive importance.
In this case, Dorothy L. Reese was a can
didate for the degree of Master of Arts in
teaching at Johns Hopkins University. All
candidates for this degree were required
to engage in "internship teaching"
whereby the student took full responsibil
ity for a classroom. To meet this require
ment, Ms. Reese taught 20 hours a week
in a public school in Baltimore County,
Maryland, during the period February 1
to June 30. She replaced a regular teacher
and was paid $1,900 by the County Board
of Education. Such amount was in accor
dance with the salary scale for a teacher
holding a Bachelor's Degree but not cer
tified for teaching by the State.
The taxpayer contended that since con
ferral of the degree was conditioned on
her performance of teaching services, the
amount received was excludable pur
suant to Section 117(a) and 117(b)(1) of the
Code. In the alternative, she contended
that the teaching was primarily for the
advancement of her skills as a teacher and
not primarily for the benefit of the Board
of Education, with the result that the

payments were excludable under Section and availability of funds, not financial
1.117-4(c) of the Regulations. The tax need; (2) taxpayer understood from the
payer insisted in her first contention that beginning of the fall quarter that he was to
in enacting Section 117(b)(1), Congress ef be paid for services rendered; (3) the
fectively established a "mechanical" test source of funds was the general university
whereby amounts received for part-time budget which is used to pay all professors
services should be automatically excluded and instructors, Iowa State University did
without regard to a "primary purpose" not have authority to grant fellowships
test. In disposing of this contention, the from these funds; (4) the department
court delved into the legislative history of chairman generally treated all teaching
Section 117. The court pointed out that the assistants in the department as employees
House intended that there first be a schol and Iowa State University believed that
arship or fellowship grant and then de an employer-employee relationship ex
creed that if part-time services were in isted between each teaching assistant and
volved the portion of the grant allocable the University; and (5) Iowa State Univer
thereto was to be included in gross in sity withheld Federal income tax from the
come. All the Senate did by adding a payments.
In the cases of Edward A. and Suzanne
"new sentence" was to deal with the situ
ation where a dual condition existed; ie, M. Jamieson, 51 T.C. 635(1969), and Robert
where the part-time services were re N. and Svaja V. Worthington, T.C. Memo
quired to obtain the degree and were also 1972-111, the Tax Court applied a "prim
a prerequisite to receiving the scholar ary" purpose test in concluding amounts
ship. In other words, in the Reese case, the paid to teaching assistants were compen
court held that before the exclusion comes sation.
into play, there must first be a determina
In the cases ofChanderP. Bhalla, 35 T.C.
tion the payment has the normal charac 13(1960), and Robert H. Steiman, 56 T.C.
teristics associated with the term "schol 1350(1971), the Tax Court held the
arship". Only if the amount received is a petitioners were entitled to exclude
scholarship do the limitation and the ex amounts received as scholarships or fel
ception thereto become operative. Stated lowship grants. However, the Internal
differently, the Internal Revenue Service, Revenue Service does not feel these cases
in applying the law, looks to the provi represent an erosion of the standards set
sions of Section 117(a). The limitations in forth in the Reese case, since the court
Section 117(b) are considered only after it seemed to agree the "primary" purpose
is decided there is a scholarship or fellow test was the controlling rule of law. In the
ship grant involved.
Steiman case, the court expressly adopted
In the case of Donald R. DiBona, T.C. the holding in Reese but determined that
Memo 1968-214, the taxpayer was a can the payments to the petitioners had satis
didate for the degree of Doctor of fied the criteria mandated by Reese.
In summary, the Internal Revenue Ser
Philosophy at Iowa State University. He
received a teaching assistantship for the vice will apply the rationale advanced in
academic year. He did not teach the first the Reese, Jamieson, DiBona, and
three months of the,appointment because Worthington cases in determining if
of a lack of student interest in the course. amounts paid for teaching, research or
However, during that period, he began other services qualify as .scholarships or
preparations to teach the following quar fellowship grants. If it is concluded the
ter and occasionally gave demonstrations amounts paid to the recipient are for work
and performed services with regard to rather than study, then such amounts will
other formal courses. When he began be included in income even though such
teaching, during the winter quarter, his teaching, research, or other services are
class met for two afternoons a week. Dur required of all candidates for the degree.
ing the year for which he received the
We would also like to comment on the
assistantship, the University did not im Supreme Court decision in the case of
pose a minimum teaching requirement Johnson, 394 U.S. 741(1969). In this case,
on every graduate candidate as a condi three individuals held engineering posi
tion to receiving the Ph.D. Degree. How tions at the Bettis Atomic Power Labora
ever, his main professor made it under tory in Pittsburgh. The laboratory is
stood that all students under his supervi owned by the Government and is oper
sion and control would have to teach at ated by Westinghouse under a contract
with the Atomic Energy Commission.
least one quarter.
In holding the primary purpose of the Under Westinghouse's educational pro
payments was compensation for services, gram, when employees have completed
the Tax Court noted the following items: all preliminary requirements for the
(1) the number of teaching assistantships doctorate, they may apply for an educa
was dependent on the need for teachers tional leave of absence. They must submit

a proposed dissertation topic for approval
by Westinghouse and the Atomic Energy
Commission. Approval is based on a de
termination the topic has at least some
general relevance to the work done at Bet
tis. If the leave of absence is secured, the
employees devote their full attention, or
dinarily for a nine month period, to fulfil
ling their dissertation requirements. Dur
ing this period, employees receive a
stipend in an amount based on a specified
percentage (from 70 to 90 percent) of their
prior salary. They also retain their senior
ity status and receive all employee ben
efits, such as insurance and stock option
privileges. In return, they must not only
submit periodic progress reports, but
under the written agreement that all par
ticipants must sign, they are obligated to
return to the employ of Westinghouse for
a period of at least two years following the
completion of their leave. The taxpayers
involved in this case took leaves under the
Westinghouse program and eventually
received their doctorate degrees. They
claimed the stipends received were nontaxable under Section 117 of the Code.
The Supreme Court reasoned Congress
did not intend to exclude all payments
from an individual's income however
large or whatever their source, simply be
cause they happened to assist him or her
while in school. The court made it clear
that where a person is paid by his or her
employer while in school as part of a bar
gain whereby the individual in turn
agrees to work for the grantor, the pay
ments are essentially compensation and
should not be excluded as scholarship
funds.
It is interesting to note that the Tax
Court of the United States quoted the case
of Johnson in the J.E. MacDonald case, 52
T.C. 386(1969). The Tax Court held that
payments received by Mr. J.E. Mac
Donald from his employer (I.B.M.) while
pursuing studies at a university were
compensation and were not excludable
from gross income as a scholarship or fel
lowship. The Tax Court felt the rationale
advanced in Johnson applied even though
the taxpayer was not legally obligated to
return to his job at I .B .M. or to reimburse
I.B.M. The court concluded the fact that
I.B.M. expected the taxpayer to return to
work was sufficient to bring the case
within the scope of the Johnson decision.
The Internal Revenue Service will, of
course, apply the principles established
in the Johnson case when determining if
amounts paid are compensation for ser
vices or primarily for the benefit of the
grantor (Regulations 1.117-4(c)).
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